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2Epistemic Democracy:  Assaying the Options
Classical debates, recently rejoined, rage over the question of whether we
want our political outcomes to be right or whether we want them to be fair.
Democracy can be (and has been) justified in either way, or both at once.
For epistemic democrats, the aim of democracy is to "track the truth."1
For them, democracy is more desirable than alternative forms of decision-
making because, and insofar as, it does that.  One democratic decision rule is
more desirable than another according to that same standard, so far as
epistemic democrats are concerned.2
For procedural democrats, the aim of democracy is instead to embody
certain procedural virtues.3  Procedural democrats are divided among
themselves over what those virtues might be, as well as over which
procedures best embody them.  But all procedural democrats agree on the
one central point that marks them off from epistemic democrats:  for
procedural democrats, there is no "independent truth of the matter" which
outcomes ought track; instead, the goodness or rightness of an outcome is
wholly constituted by the fact of its having emerged in some procedurally
correct manner.4
                                                
1 Estlund (1990; 1993; 1997; 1998) is the most assiduous contemporary advocate of that
position, but he has illustrous predecessors.  Rousseau recommended democracy on the
grounds that it tracks truths about the "general will" and "common good" (Rousseau
1762, bk 4, ch. 2; Barry 1964 , pp. 9-14; Grofman and Feld 1988; Coleman 1989, pp. 204-5;
cf. Estlund, Waldron, Grofman and Feld 1989; Miller 1992, p. 56).  Nineteenth-century
utilitarians advocated democracy on the grounds it tracked truths about "the greatest
good for the greatest number" (Mill 1823).
2 As characterized in Cohen's (1986, p. 34) article "An epistemic theory of democracy,"
which is primarily responsible for introducing the term into the literature, "An
epistemic interpretation of voting has three main elements:  (1) an    independent   
standard    of correct decisions — that is, an account of justice or of the common good that
is independent of current consensus and the outcome of votes; (2) a    cognitive    account of
voting — that is, the view that voting expresses beliefs about what the correct policies
are according to the independent standard, not personal preferences for policies; and (3)
an account of     decision making    as a process of the adjustment of beliefs, adjustments that
are undertaken in part in light of the evidence about the correct answer that is
provided by the beliefs of others."
3 The modern    locus     classicus   is Dahl 1979.  See similarly Schumpeter 1950, pt 4.
4 Coleman and Ferejohn (1986, p. 7) define "the     proceduralist   approach to the justification
of collective decision" as one which "identif[ies] a set of ideals with which any
3Sometimes there is no tension between epistemic and procedural
democrats, with all strands of democratic theory pointing in the same
direction.  That is the case where there are only two options before us.  Then
epistemic democrats, appealing to Condorcet's jury theorem, say the
majority winner is most likely to be the correct outcome.5  Procedural
democrats of virtually every stripe agree.  They, too, hold that majority
voting is the best social decision rule in the two-option case; but their appeal
is to the procedural, rather than truth-tracking, merits of majority voting.6
Although the many different rules that different procedural democrats
recommend (Condorcet pairwise comparisons, the Borda count, the Hare or
Coombs systems, etc.7) might point in different directions in many-option
cases, in the merely two-option case they do not.  There, all the favorite
decision rules of practically all democrats, procedural or epistemic, coincide
on the majority winner.8
This happy coincidence is confined to the two-option case, however.
Where there are three or more options on the table, recommendations of the
                                                                                                                              
collective decision-making procedure ought to comply...  [A] process of collective
decision making would be more or less justifiable depending on the extent to which it
satisfies them.... Proceduralism holds that what justifies a decision-making procedure
is a     necessary    property of the procedure — one entailed by the definition of the
procedure alone" rather than deriving from any calculation of consequences of applying
that procedure.
5 For elaboration of the jury theorem, see Section II below.
6 In particular, May's (1952) theorem is often adduced here, which shows that in a two-
option case majority rule is the unique  social decision rule satisfying some arguably
compelling minimal conditions (decisiveness, anonymity, neutrality and positive
responsiveness).
7 For definitions of all these different rules, see the key to Table 2 below.  For further
discussion of these and other decision rules, together with analyses of the extent to
which they select the same outcomes, see Levin and Nalebuff (1995) and Merrill (1984).
For a discussion of their formal properties from a social-choice theoretic perspective,
see Riker (1983, ch. 4).
8 Indeed, as Borda (1784/1995, pp. 88-9) shows, the majority winner will also be the
Condorcet and Borda winners whenever m>(k-1)/k, where      m is the proportion of votes
the majority winner receives and     k is the number of options over which they are voting.
Note therefore that super-majority rules can have the same effect, in many-option
elections (a two-thirds requirement in a three-option contest et seq.).   Thus, in even in
the many-option case, there is convergence between the recommendations of those other
procedurally-favored rules and rule by supermajorities of a requisite size.
4different strands of democratic theory diverge.9  Much modern writing on
both social choice and electoral reform is dedicated to exploring the merits of
alternate ways of aggregating people's votes into an overall social decision.10
Heretofore, however, those disputes have been conducted almost purely as
intramural arguments within the proceduralist camp.  Different social
decision rules display different procedural virtues, and it is on that basis that
we are typically invited to choose among them.
There is an epistemic dimension to that choice as well, however.  It is a
mistake to suppose (as philosophers writing about epistemic democracy
sometimes seem to do11) that their epistemic case for democracy based on
the Condorcet jury theorem collapses where there are more than two
options on the table.  Anathema though it may be to some procedural
democrats, plurality voting is arguably the simplest and possibly the most
frequently used voting rule in many-option cases.  Here we prove that the
Condorcet jury theorem can indeed be generalized from majority voting
over two options to plurality voting over many options.
That proof merely shows that the plurality rule is an "epistemically
eligible" decision rule, however — not necessarily that it is uniquely
preferred, epistemically.12  In addition to the proof of the truth-seeking
power of the plurality rule, offered here for the first time, there has already
been established a proof of the truth-seeking powers (in a much richer
                                                
9 Thus, Borda (1784/1995, p. 83) begins his famous paper initiating these debates with the
words, "There is a widespread feeling, which I have never heard disputed, that in a
ballot vote, the plurality of votes always shows the will of the voters.  That is, that
the candidate who obtains this plurality is necessarily preferred by the voters to his
opponents.  But I shall demonstrate that this feeling, while correct when the election is
between just two candidates, can lead to error in all other cases."
10 Surveyed, respectively, in Mueller (1989) and  Dummett (1985; 1997).
11 Listing reasons for thinking "the Jury Theorem approach to the epistemic value of
democratic procedures is less than trustworthy," Estlund (1997, p. 189) includes the bald
assertion:  "the Jury Theorem assumes there are only two alternatives" (our emphasis).
12 Especially, as we shall see, when there is more information available about voters'
preferences than just  a single vote for each voter.
5informational environment) of the Condorcet pairwise criteria and Borda
count.13
Where there are more than two options, different social decision rules
seem to be differentially reliable truth-trackers.  Furthermore, some rules
seem to perform better under certain circumstances than others.  We offer
some sample calculations to suggest the dimensions and directions of these
differences.  But the differences are not great, and even the much-maligned
plurality rule performs epistemically almost as well as any of the others
where the number of voters is at all large (even just over 50, say).
We take no side in these disputes between epistemic and procedural
democrats or among contending factions of proceduralists.  We express no
view on how much weight ought be given epistemic power compared to
procedural virtues in choosing a social decision rule.  Neither do we express
any view on which procedural virtues are the most important for a decision
rule to display.  Our aim in this article is merely to "calibrate the epistemic
trade-off" that might be involved in opting for one social decision rule rather
than some other.
Our principal conclusion is that those epistemic trade-offs are not
great.  So long as the number of voters is reasonably large, virtually any of
the social decision rules which have been commonly employed or
recommended on democratic-proceduralist grounds seem to perform
reasonably well (and nearly as well as  any other) on epistemic-democratic
grounds.  A crucial corollary is that (assuming there is any epistemic
dimension to politics at all) there is thus a strong epistemic case to be made
                                                
13 The proof of Young (1988; 1995), building on Condorcet (1785) himself, works in a very
different way to ours, through sequences of     pairwise    votes over more than two options.
For why we find our method preferable, see footnote 30 below.  The "informational
environment" must be richer for Condorcet pairwise comparisons and the Borda count,
because those require us to know each voter's complete preference orderings over all
options, whereas plurality voting requires only that we know each voter's first-choice
preference.
6for using democratic decision rules, whatever particular form we might prefer
on democratic-proceduralist grounds.
I.  Varieties of Epistemic and Procedural Democracy
As background to all those formal and computational results, let us first
indicate briefly some of the key differences between and within theories of
epistemic and procedural democracy.
A.  Epistemic Democracy
The hallmark of the epistemic approach, in all its forms, is its fundamental
premise that there exists some procedure-independent fact of the matter as to
what the best or right outcome is.  The epistemic approach tells us that our
social decision rules ought be chosen so as to track that truth.
Where there is some decision rule which always tracks that truth
without error, that can be called an epistemically "perfect" decision rule.  It is
hard to think what such a social decision rule might be.14  Democratic
procedures, we can safely assume, will almost certainly never be commended
as fitting that bill.
At best, democracy can be recommended as an epistemically
"imperfect" decision rule.  The defining feature of epistemically imperfect
decision rules is that they track the truth, but they do so imperfectly.  Their
outcomes are often right, without being always right.
                                                
14 Except perhaps theocratic conceptions of truths revealed through god's chosen
spokesperson:  but even then only if god reveals the truth, the whole truth and only the
truth; and even then only if the person receiving god's revelations never mistakes god's
words.
7Where there is no epistemically perfect decision rule available,
advocates of the epistemic approach must choose the best truth-tracker
among the array of epistemically imperfect decision rules actually available.
It is not self-evident that democratic procedures of any sort will
necessarily be recommended on those grounds.15  Still, the epistemic virtues
of information-pooling —which is what democracy amounts to, from this
perspective — are such that democracy might lay a surprisingly strong claim
to being the best imperfect epistemic procedure available.16  We say more on
this score in subsequent sections, below.
B.  Procedural Democracy
The hallmark of procedural approaches in all their forms is the fundamental
premise that there exists no procedure-independent fact of the matter as to
what the best or right social outcome is.  Rather, it is the application of the
appropriate procedure which is itself constitutive of what the best or right
outcome is.
Procedures which are themselves constitutive in this way of the best or
right outcome can be called procedurally "perfect" social decision rules.17
                                                
15 Some say that epistemic criteria naturally favor "epistocracy" (rule by the
epistemologically privileged alone) over democracy (rule by all the people, whatever
their epistemic credentials).   But given the epistemic advantages of information-
pooling, it is sometimes better to pool information from more sources, even if that means
drawing on less reliable sources (Young 1995, p. 53 n. 2); and Grofman, Owen and Feld
(1983, p. 275) suggest that where the number of voters is large, assigning optimal
weights them on the basis of competence might not produce very much better results,
epistemically, than just giving them all equal weight regardless of competence.
16 On models of information-pooling more generally, as well as the Condorcet jury theorem
as an example of it, see Grofman and Owen (1986).   Waldron (1999, ch. 5) even finds a
version of this argument in Aristotle's     Politics   , bk 3, ch. 11.
17 Or example, on the Austinian theory of sovereignty, for example, the "command of the
Queen in Parliament" were fully constitutive of law and hence of political right, at
least in that (limited) sense.  Or, for another example, blunt democrats sometimes say
the same:  whatever comes out of a vote of Parliament, or a vote of the People, is the
right outcome; there can be no other standard of what is politically best or right,
beyond that.
8Procedures which are not themselves constitutive of the right or best
outcome, but which merely track (more or less perfectly) the outputs of those
other (ideal-typical) procedures which are, can be called procedurally
"imperfect" social decision rules.18
Where the perfect procedure cannot itself be directly implemented as
the social decision rule, advocates of the procedural approach must choose
among the array of imperfect social decision rules that are actually available
whatever decision rule best tracks the perfect procedure's right-making
dictates.
What attributes of social procedures, if any, should be regarded as
constitutive in this way of politically best or right outcomes is of course a
highly contentious issue — and one which we do not here propose to
resolve.19
Let us just offer an illustrative list of a few of the very different sorts of
procedural criteria which have been recommended from time to time:
•Democratic proceduralists of an older and less formal bent have long
insisted, among other things:  that elections should be "free and fair,"
with voting proceeding without intimidation or corruption, and all
valid ballots being counted; that the franchise should be broad, and
elections regular and frequent; that the rules governing voting and
elections should be common knowledge, and the procedure by which
votes are transformed into decisions being publicly transparent (which
is perhaps the main thing the "first past the post" plurality rule has
going for it, procedurally20).
                                                
18 For example, certain sorts of deliberative democrats say that the right thing to do is
constituted by what would have been agreed in an "ideal speech situation," which can
only be imperfectly approximated by any actual political arrangements.
19 Any more than we attempted to resolve all the highly contentious philosophical issues
in epistemology, in talking under the epistemological heading of "the truth."
20 "A voting method should be relative simple and transparent, both for voters and for those
calculating the winner....  Simplicity helps explain why plurality voting is so
widespread..." (Levin and Nalebuff 1995, p. 19).
9•Democratic proceduralists have also long insisted, with increasing precision
and formality over the past couple of centuries, that the social
decisions ought be systematically responsive to the preferences
expressed by the voters; and democratic proceduralists have
increasingly come to insist that that should be understood as meaning
that they should be systematically responsive to "all the preferences of
all the people" (which is what democratic proceduralists from Borda
forward have had against plurality rule21).
•Democratic proceduralists of a more formal bent have recently added
various axiomatic desiderata to the list of procedural criteria. They
typically specify a set of (normative) minimal conditions that any
acceptable social decision procedure should satisfy22; and they then
                                                
21 "If a form of election is to be just, the voters must be able to rank     e a c h     candidate according
to his merits, compared successively to the merits of     each of the others   ... "  Borda does
on to criticize plurality voting on precisely those grounds ("...the conventional form of
election is highly unsatisfactory, because in this type of election, the voters cannot give
a sufficiently complete account of their opinions of the candidates...").  Borda further
recommends a system wherein "each voter ranks the candidates in order of merit" (or in
which "we hold as many elections as there are combinations of candidates taken two by
two so that each candidate can be compared to each of the others in turn" which as he
says "is easy to see ... necessarily derives from the first") on the grounds that such a
"method clearly gives us the      most complete expression possible of the voters' opinions
on all the candidates   "  (Borda 1784/1995, p. 84, our emphases).   As Dummett (1997, pp.
51-2) says, more simply, "Impartial reflection shows that the number of voters who
think each candidate the worst ... is no less important ... than the number of voters who
think each candidate the best" — and so on (we might add, in the spirit of his remarks)
for every ranking in between (see more generally Dummett 1984, ch. 6; 1997, pp. 51-7).
Notice similarly the comments in Dahl's seminal     Preface to Democratic
Theory    (1956):  "the principle of majority rule," Dahl writes, "prescribes that in
chosing among alternatives, the alternative preferred by the greater number is
selected.  That is, given two or more alternatives     x,     y, etc., in order for     x to be
government policy it is a necessary and sufficient condition that the number who prefer
x    to any alternative is greater than the number who prefer any single alternative to     x"
(pp. 37-8).  But instead of giving this Rule the plurality-rule interpretation toward
which it naturaly seems to tend, Dahl goes on to say, quite emphatically, that:  "The
essential requirement   of a system of voting that will satisfy the Rule is that voters ...
must have an opportunity to vote for each alternative paired with another of the
alternatives in a series of pairs sufficiently complete so that the alternative most
preferred by a majority, if one such exists, will necessarily be selected.  In some cases,
this requires that a vote be cast on every pair of alternatives" (p. 43, our emphasis).
22  Such as Arrow's (1963) famous conditions of transitivity of social orderings, universal
domain, the weak Pareto principle, independence of irrelevant of alternatives and non-
dictatorship.
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determine what social decision procedures, if any, satisfy these
conditions.23
•Finally, democratic proceduralists might also include among their desiderata
more pragmatic considerations of implementability, ranging from
considerations of mere cost to ones of sheer computability.24  Some
decision rules are informationally much more demanding than others,
for example (the plurality rule requiring only information about
people's first-choice preferences, whereas the others discussed below
all require information about people's full preference orderings over
all options).
Prioritizing different of those (and many other) procedural desiderata
lead different procedural democrats to recommend different social decision
rules.  Since our concern in this paper is principally with the epistemic
implications of that choice among social decision rules, we merely note those
ongoing disputes within the democratic proceduralist camp and pass over
them without further comment.
II.  Extending the Jury Theorem:  Plurality Voting over Many Options
                                                
23  As is well known, the set of social decision rules satisfying Arrow's conditions (in a
framework of ordinal preferences without interpersonal comparability) is empty.  If
universal domain is relaxed, the pairwise Condorcet criterion satisfies the other
conditions, and if independence of irrelevant alternatives is relaxed, the Borda count
satisfies the other conditions. For a more comprehensive overview of the main results of
axiomatic social choice theory, see e.g. Sen (1982, esp. ch. 8).  For application to voting
rules specifically, see Riker (1983, ch. 4).
24 Condorcet (1792/1994, p. 218; 1792/1995, p. 145) acknowledges the impracticality of his
exhaustive pairwise comparison procedure:  "it is both awkward and time-consuming to
form an initial judgment about the merits of the candidates and difficult to rank a large
number of  candidates in order of merit.  Moreover, to extract these lists each voter's
opinion on all the candidates taken two by two and to use this to deduce a general result
would be an immense and lengthy task."  Indeed, some voting procedures, including ones
following from Condorcet's and Lewis Carroll's proposals, are not computationally
feasible; see Bartholdi, Tovey and Trick 1989.
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The Condorcet jury theorem, in its standard form, says this.  If each member
of a jury is more likely to be right than wrong, then the majority of the jury,
too, is more likely to be right than wrong; and the probability that the right
outcome is supported by a majority of the jury is a (swiftly) increasing
function of the size of the jury, converging to 1 as the size of the jury tends to
infinity.25
Extrapolating from juries to electorates more generally, that result
constitutes the jewel in the crown of epistemic democrats, who offer it as
powerful evidence of the truth-tracking merits of majority rule.26  Much
work has been done — by statisticians, economists, political scientists and
others — to extend that result in many ways.  It has been shown, for
example, that a jury theorem still holds if not every member of the jury has
exactly the same probability of choosing the correct outcome:  all that is
required is that the mean probability of being right across the jury be above
one-half.27  It is also known, for another example, that a jury theorem still
holds even if there are (certain sorts of) interdependencies between the
judgments of different electors.28   The effects of strategic voting in a
Condorcet jury context have also been studied extensively, showing mixed
results.29  And so on.
What extensions and elaborations of the Condorcet jury theorem have
almost invariably preserved, however, is the binary-choice form.  (This is true
in a way even of Peyton Young, who following Condorcet's own lead
extends the theorem to cases of more than two options, but does so through
a series of pairwise votes between them.30)  The choice is thus typically
                                                
25 Condorcet 1785, p. 279 ff.  Black 1958, pp. 163-5.
26 Barry 1964 , pp. 9-14; 1965, Appendix A, pp. 292-3.  Kuflik 1977, pp. 305-8.  Spitz 1984, p.
206.  Cohen 1986, p. 35.  Grofman and Feld 1988; cf. Estlund, Waldron, Grofman and Feld
1989.  Martin 1993, pp. 142-4, 370-1.  Gaus 1997, pp. 149-50.  Estlund 1993, pp. 92-4.
27 Grofman and Feld 1983, pp. 268 ff.  Borland 1989, p. 183.
28 Grofman and Feld 1983, pp. 273-4.  Borland 1989, p. 185-6.  Ladha 1992.  Estlund 1994.
29 Austen-Smith and Banks 1996.  Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1998.  Wit 1998.  Coughlan
2000.  Gerardi 2000.  Guarnaschelli, McKelvey and Palfrey 2000.
30 Like Condorcet (1785) before him, Young (1988; 1995) assumes that each voter has the
same probability of making the correct choice in each pairwise comparison as each
12
between two options, or a series of options taken two-at-a-time.  And in
choosing between each of those pairs the average competence of voters is
required to be over one-half.31
Democratic theorists rightly remark that those constitute real limits on
any epistemic case for democracy built on these foundations.  As Estlund
says, there is no reason to think that most important decisions in a
democracy are going to boil down to two options (or, we might add, can be
innocuously decomposed into a series of such two-option decisions).32  As
Gaus says, there is no reason to think that people are generally more than
half-likely to be right (particularly, we might add, where there are more than
two options) — and the standard Condorcet jury theorem result works
equally dramatically in reverse where they are more likely to be wrong than
right, the probability of the collective choice being wrong growing
exponentially with the size of the electorate.33
Here we show that the Condorcet jury theorem can actually provide
more comfort to epistemic democrats than previously imagined.  Contrary to
what they conventionally suppose, it can be extended even to plurality voting
among many options.  And contrary to what epistemic democrats
                                                                                                                              
other voter and as in each other pairwise comparison.  On the face of it, this seems
problematic insofar as it seems to treat probabilities in each of a voter's pairwise
choices as independent of those in each of the same voter's other pairwise choices,
when the probabilities in the one case may seem to constrain and be constrained by the
probabilities in all the others (especially if people's preferences satisfy certain
consistency conditions).
31 Or almost always so:  as Grofman and Feld (1983, p. 271) show, the majority might be
more likely to be right than wrong even if the average competence of voters drops to
pmean>0.471, although the value goes that low only when there are merely three
voters.
32 Estlund 1997, p. 189.  Shapley and Grofman (1984, p. 337) write, "The theorems discussed
in this essay concern dichotomous choice, but this restriction may not be as serious as it
might at first seem.  If a group must choose from a set of alternatives (k ‡ 2), then it may
do so by using any one of a number of binary choice procedures that decompose into
sequences of pairwise (right fork or left fork) choices."  But as Riker (1983, p. 60) says,
"Unfortunately, there is no fair way to ensure that there will be exactly two
alternatives.  Usually the political world offers many options, which, for simple
majority decision, must be reduced to two.  But usually ... the way the reduction occurs
determines which two will be decided between.  There are many methods to reduce the
many to two; but, as has long been obvious to politicians, none of these methods is
particularly fair ... . because all methods can be rigged."
33 Gaus 1997, p. 150.
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conventionally suppose, voter competences can in those many-option cases
drop well below fifty percent and the plurality winner still be most likely the
correct choice.34
We provide an extension of Condorcet's jury theorem to the case of
plurality voting over k options, where precisely one option (say, option i) is
supposed to be the epistemically "correct" outcome.  Specifically, we show the
following:
(1) Suppose there are k options and that each voter/juror has
independent probabilities p1, p2, ..., pk of voting for options 1, 2,
..., k, respectively, where the probability, pi, of voting for the
"correct" outcome, i, exceeds each of the probabilities, pj, of
voting for any of the "wrong" outcomes, j „  i.  Then the "correct"
option is more likely than any other option to be the plurality
winner.
(2) As the number of voters/jurors tends to infinity, the probability
of the "correct" option being the plurality winner converges to
1.
The formal result is contained in Appendix 1. There are endless
refinements and extensions of our result that might be made.35  And there
are endless further issues that jury theorems, in all their forms, must
eventually confront.36  For the purposes of this paper, we eschew these more
technical issues, preferring to concentrate on the philosophical implications of
                                                
34 How can that be?  After all, if the probability of each voter being right is less than half,
is not the probability of each being wrong more than half?  And in that case, does not
the "reverse Condorcet" result set in, with a vengeance?  The answer, of course, is
simple.  Under plurality rules the winner does not have to beat     a l l   the other options
taken together.  It has only to beat     e a c h     of its rivals taken separately, where the
opposition is divided k-1 ways.
35 For example, we here assume that all voters have identical competence, that is,
identical probabilities of voting correctly.  The standard (majority voting, two option)
Condorcet jury theorem has been generalized to cases of unequal levels of competence
across voters/jurors; it is sufficient that their heterogeneous competences be
symmetrically distributed around a mean which s itself greater than 1/2 (Grofman,
Owen and Feld 1983, pp. 268-9). Similar generalizations might be made in the k-option
case.
36 Most especially, issues of strategic voting.
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this extended Condorcet jury theorem in its simplest form for democratic
theory more generally.
The major consequences of the result, as it bears on theories of
epistemic democracy, would seem to be the following:
Consequence 1:   The epistemically correct option is always more likely
than any other option to be the plurality winner.37  The
epistemically correct option may or may not be more likely than
not to be the plurality winner, where there are more than two
options on the table.38  But at least it is always more likely to be
the plurality winner than is any other option.
Consequence 2: Where there are several options on the table, the
plurality jury theorem can work even where each voter is
substantially less than 1/2 likely to be correct, as required in
Condorcet's original two-option formulation.  The epistemically
correct choice is the most probable among k options to be the
plurality winner, just so long as each voter's probability of
voting for the correct outcome exceeds each of that voter's
probabilities of voting for any of the wrong outcomes.  This
implies that, if error is distributed perfectly equally, a better than
1/k chance of being correct is sufficient for the epistemically
correct option to be most likely to be the plurality winner
among k options.
Consequence 3:  So long as each voter is more likely to choose the
correct outcome than any other, the correct option is more
likely than any other option to be the plurality winner,
                                                
37 If all we know are people's first-preference votes, we can infer from Consequence 1 by
Bayesian reasoning that the plurality winner is more likely than any other choice to be
the epistemically correct option.  Moving to a richer informational environment where
we know people's full rankings over all options, as in the next section below, there will
sometimes be choices (such as the Condorcet-pairwise or Borda winners) that are by
similar Bayesian reasoning even more likely to be the epistemically correct options.
38 That depends on whether or not the number of voters/jurors is sufficiently large for the
probability of the correct option being the plurality winner to be greater than 1/2.
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regardless of how likely each voter is to choose any other option.
Even if each voter is more than 1/k likely to choose each of
several outcomes, the correct one is more likely to be the
plurality winner than any other, just so long as the voter is
more likely to vote for the correct outcome than that other
outcome.
While the result says that the probability of the correct option being
the plurality winner converges to certainty as the number of voters tends to
infinity, it says nothing about how quickly that probability increases with
increases in the size of the electorate.  So far as epistemic democrats are
concerned, how the function behaves at the limit — where the number of
voters approaches infinity — is of less practical significance than how it
behaves presented with plausible-sized electorates.  The great boast of the
Condorcet jury theorem in its traditional form is that the probability of the
correct option being the majority winner grows quite quickly with increases
in the size of the electorate.  To what extent can the extended plurality jury
theorem make the same boast?
To address that question, we present in Table 1 some illustrative
calculations.  (All these calculations are based on Proposition 1 in Appendix 1.)
The first thing to note in Table 1 is this.  Where each voter is more than half-
likely to choose the correct option, the probability of the correct option being
the plurality winner not only increases quickly with the size of the electorate:
it increases all the more quickly in the k-option case than it does in the 2-option
case.  Where each voter is just over half-likely to choose the correct option in
the k=2 case, the correct option has a probability of only 0.557 of being the
plurality (majority) winner in an electorate of 51 voters; in the k=3 case, the
probability of the correct option being the plurality winner in a same-sized
electorate jumps to 0.937.  In that (informal) sense, plurality winners in the k-
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option case might be said to be even more reliable than majority winners in
the 2-option case.
[Table 1 about here]
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Table 1:   Probability that the "correct" option (option 1) is the unique
plurality winner
number
of
options
(k)
probabilities
p1, p2, ..., pk
probability that option 1 (the "correct"
option) is the unique plurality winner for
n=
11 51 101 301 601 1001
2 0.51, 0.49 0.527 0.557 0.580 0.636 0.688 0.737
0.6, 0.4 0.753 0.926 0.979 » 1 » 1 » 1
3 0.34, 0.33, 0.33 0.268 0.338 0.358 0.407 0.449 0.489
0.4, 0.35, 0.25 0.410 0.605 0.692 0.834 0.918 0.965
0.5, 0.3, 0.2 0.664 0.937 0.987 » 1 » 1 » 1
4 0.26, 0.25, 0.25, 0.24 0.214 0.266 0.296 0.361 0.420 0.476
0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1 0.512 0.770 0.873 0.980 0.998 » 1
0.5, 0.3, 0.1, 0.1 0.708 0.939 0.987 » 1 » 1 » 1
5 0.21, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.19 0.157 0.214 0.243 0.308
0.3, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.1 0.360 0.653 0.812 0.980
0.35, 0.2, 0.15, 0.15, 0,15 0.506 0.883 0.974 » 1
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A second thing to note from Table 1 is how plurality rule performs
where voters are just slightly more likely to choose the correct option than
incorrect ones.  Where each voter's probability of choosing the correct option
from among k options is just over 1/k and the probability of choosing
incorrect ones just under that, the probability of the correct option being the
plurality winner increases much more slowly with increases in the size of the
electorate.  Compare this with the standard two-option Condorcet jury result
in the case in which each voter is just over 1/2 likely to choose the correct
option:  as Table 1 shows, it takes over a thousand voters before the
probability of the correct option being the plurality (majority) winner is 0.737,
where each voter has only a probability of 0.51 of voting for the correct
outcome.  Similarly for the many-option case:  the probability of the correct
option being the plurality winner increases much more slowly where the
probability of each voter being correct is near 1/k, compared to cases where
the probability of each voter choosing the correct outcome is even just a little
higher.  But even in these "worst-case" scenarios, the movement of the
probability figures is clearly in the desired direction; and, as the size of the
electorate increases, the probability of the correct option being the plurality
winner will eventually approach certainty.
IV.  Comparing Truth-Trackers
The plurality rule is not the unique truth-tracker in the k-option case.
Condorcet himself pointed to others, in passages in his Essai immediately
following his development of the jury theorem itself.39   Contemporary social
                                                
39 1785, pp. 122 ff.  Black 1958, pp. 168-71.  McLean and Hewitt 1994, pp. 38-40.
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choice theorists tend to see a sharp disjunction at this point in his text40; and in
terms of technique and methodology there certainly is.41  But Condorcet's
own concerns remained resolutely epistemic throughout; and those grounds
(rather than the proceduralist ones more standardly attributed to him by
many contemporary social-choice interpreters) are the ones on which
Condorcet himself proceeds to recommend what has become famous as the
"Condorcet winner" criterion based on pairwise comparisons for k-option
cases.42
Condorcet's own analysis at this point the Essai is notoriously
opaque.43  In consequence, it lay largely neglected for most of the intervening
two centuries.  Duncan Black saw what Condorcet was up to, but he was
unable to elucidate it in a way that seized the broader attention of democratic
theorists in the same way that his exposition of the jury theorem did.44  More
recently, Young's results are effectively a restatement of Condorcet's analysis
in modern statistical terms; but that restatement, too, seems to have largely
                                                
40 As Arrow (1963, pp. 94-5) says, "Condorcet has really two different approaches.  In the
one most in line with subsequent developments, as well as with Borda's work, the chief
contribution has been what might be termed the      Condorcet criterion    , that a candidate
who receives a majority as against each other candidate should be elected.  This
implicitly accepts the view of what I have termed the independence of irrelevant
alternatives. ...  The second approach is closely related to the theory of juries which
Condorcet and others were studying.  Here the implication is rather hat voters are
judges of some truth rather than expressing their own preferences."  McLean and Hewitt
(1994, 34-5) echo, "The theory of voting in the [Condorcet]     Essai   of 1785 is really two
theories; furthermore, they are inconsistent.  When forced to make a choice between the
probabilistic theory and the social choice theory, Condorcet opts for the latter, even
though the former occupies the vast majority of the book."
41 "For whatever reason, Cordorcet abruptly changed course at this point in the     Essai   ....  He
abandoned the statistical framework that he had so painstakenly built up and fell
back on a more 'straightforward' line of reasoning [by pairwise comparisons and such
like].  In so doing he opened up a whole new approach that has had enormous influence
on the modern theory of social choice," writes Young (1988, p. 1238-9).  See similarly
Black 1958, pp. 168-71; McLean and Hewitt 1994, pp. 8383-40.  The shift in gears is
signalled clearly by Condorcet (1785/1972, pp. lxiii-lxv, 122-4) himself.
42 Black 1958, p. 163.  Granger 1968, p 214.  Young 1988, p. 1232.  Brennan 1995.
43 One commentator says, "It is quite hopeless to find out what Condorcet meant," at this
point; another that, "The obscurity and self-contradiction are without any parallel, so
far as our experience of mathematical works extends..." (both quoted in Young 1988, p.
1234).
44 Black 1958, pp. 169-7.  Cf. the take-up of Black's discussion of the jury theorem in Barry
(1964 , pp. 9-14; 1965, Appendix A, pp. 292-3) and, through him, all the others cited at
footnote 25 above.
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escaped the notice of more philosophical commentators on epistemic
democracy.45
To get a grip on Condorcet's approach, go back to the two-option
case.  There, Condorcet knew from his jury theorem that majority rule was
the best truth-tracker.  But then the problem was what the most "natural"
way to extend majority rule beyond the two-option case.  As the "scare
quotes" suggest, there is no uniquely "natural" extension.  Majority rule is a
special case, for k=2, of an (indefinitely) large number of plausible decision
rules that might be applied in the case of k>2.  Fixing majority rule as the
appropriate decision procedure for the two-option case still logically
underdetermines our choice of an appropriate decision procedure for the
many-option case.46  One alternative is the plurality rule, as just discussed.
But Condorcet (and Borda before him) had already exposed the apparent
irrationalities of that rule where k>2, so he did not consider it a viable option
worthy of further discussion at this point.  Instead, he examined another of
the "natural" extensions of majority rule to the many-option case:  pairwise
comparison.  The attraction of that rule, perhaps, was that Condorcet inferred
from his jury theorem that in binary choice situations (which each of the
pairwise choices are, of course) whichever option is chosen by a majority is
most likely to be right, assuming choosers are more likely to be right than
wrong on average.  His thought seems to have been that, if each of the
pairwise choices is likely to be correct, then the overall outcome of a series of
such choices is likely to be correct too.
To Condorcet's frustration, the logic did not quite privilege his
pairwise comparisons uniquely.  Everything turns out to depend upon how
much more than half-likely voters were to be correct.  If they were much
                                                
45 Young 1988, pp. 1238 ff.; 1995.  This paper is well-known among Condorcet scholars, of
course (McLean and Hewitt 1994, pp. 38-40), and technical social choice theorists.
Among democratic theorists more generally, however, we have noticed only one passing
reference to Young's paper (Miller 1992, p. 66 n. 28); and that failed to emphasize what
we here regard as really distinctive about that paper.
46 Quine 1961.
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more likely to be correct in each pairwise choice (i.e. if their competence is
close to 1), then the option most likely to be the correct one is the winner
under Condorcet's pairwise method.  But if voters were only barely more
than half-likely to be correct in each pairwise choice (i.e. if their competence is
close to 0.5), then the option most likely to be the correct one is the winner
under the Borda count.  This, in a nutshell, is the result that Condorcet
discovered and that Young has proven more formally.47
The history, however interesting, is neither here nor there.  Our
purpose in recounting the tale is merely to remind ourselves that several
decision rules might have considerable epistemic merit in the k-option case.
One, as we have shown above, is the plurality rule.  Others, as shown by
Young and Condorcet himself, include pairwise comparisons and the Borda
count — two of the decision rules most cherished among contemporary
procedural democrats.  The informational requirements of the latter sorts of
rules are, of course, much greater:  they need complete rankings of all
options from all voters, whereas plurality rules need only know each voter's
first choice among all the options.  But given that extra information, those
other rules track the truth too — in fact, better than plurality rule.
The actual numbers matter, though.  In the discussion of Section II, it
would have been cold comfort to epistemic democrats that the purality rule is
a good truth-tracker, just so long as the electorate is sufficiently large — if
"sufficiently large" had turned out to be some preposterously large number
(billions of billions, say).  In the present discussion, it would be similarly cold
comfort to epistemic democrats that some particular decision rules track the
                                                
47 Condorcet himself did not pursue the matter further, shifting analytic gears at this point
in the     Essai   , abandoning his probability calculus of truth and error, and turning instead
to the sorts of analyses for which he is famous among today's social choice theorists.
One reason might have been sheer personal spite:  Borda was Condorcet's great nemesis
in the Academy of Science, and some commentators suggest that he dropped the whole
line of enquiry rather than supporting the proposals of his great adversary (Young 1988,
p. 1238; McLean and Hewitt 1994, p. 40).
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truth better than others, if even the best truth-tracker turns out to track the
truth abysmally badly, by any objective standards.
In the computational exercise that follows, we set out one plausible
procedure for calculating the probabilities that each of the standardly-
discussed decision rules will pick the epistemically correct outcome, under
varying assumptions about the probabilities that each voter has of choosing
the correct (and each incorrect) option and about the number of voters.
These calculations of course represent only a small sample of all possible such
combinations; as such, they strictly speaking "prove" nothing.  Still, they are
illustrative, and the general outlines of the picture they sketch soon enough
become tolerably clear.
 To generate these probability calculations for each decision rule in the
k-option case, we require some way of moving from (a) assumptions about
the probability that each voter will choose each option (as set out in the
framework of our plurality jury theorem) to (b) inferences about the
frequencies with which voters can be expected to harbor particular "complete
orderings" of preferences over all options.  To move from (a) (the narrower
informational framework, in which the plurality jury theorem holds) to (b)
(the richer informational framework, in which rules like Condorcet's or
Borda's are applicable), we employ a specific heuristic that seems to us
particularly appealing.  But it is of course only one among many possible such
heuristics for moving from (a) to (b).  So in that sense, too, our calculations
here are merely illustrative, no more.
 Details of our heuristic are set out in Appendix 2.  Here, suffice it to say
that we start with a set of probabilities, as in the second column of Table 1,
representing the probabilities each individual has of choosing each option.
We let those probabilities dictate the probability with which each of those
respective options will appear as the first-choice option in each person's
preference ordering; for each possible first-choice option, we then let the
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relative probabilities associated with each of the remaining options dictate the
probability of each of these options' appearing as the second-choice option in the
same preference ordering; and so on until all places in the preference
ordering have been allocated.  The probability with which any given
preference ordering will be expected is adduced in this way from the product
of the probabilities of filling each of the places with the relevant options in
this fashion.
As we say, this is not the only way of proceeding from individuals'
probability profiles to probabilities of overall preference rankings.  But it has
a certain surface plausibility about it.  True, our procedure does not allow for
the possibility of incomplete, intransitive or inconsistent preference orderings
at the individual level.  But in this respect, our procedure maps a central
feature of how electoral systems themselves actually work, when evoking
full preference orderings from people.  There, just as in our procedure, voters
are typically required to rank options by assigning exactly one rank to each
option.
Using this heuristic, we generate (by stipulation) probabilities of each
voter holding each of various preference orderings from information about
probabilities of each voter supporting each of various options.  Given that
information, we can then calculate the probabilities with which each option
would win under each of various social decision rules — not just the plurality
rule, but also the Borda count, the Condorcet pairwise comparison criterion,
and the Hare and Coombs systems.  The probability that particularly
interests us, in the present context, is of course the probability that the
outcome we have stipulated as "epistemically correct" will emerge under each
of those decision procedures.
Table 2 reports the probability that correct outcome emerge from
various social decision rules, under various scenarios (different numbers of
options, different probabilities of each voter supporting each) and for
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electorates of varying size.  In this, we compare the performance of five social
decision rules:  the plurality rule; the pairwise-Condorcet rule; the Borda
count; the Hare system; and the Coombs system.  To keep the computations
manageable, we have restricted our attention to cases where k £ 3 and to cases
where the size of the electorate is 71 or smaller. To simplify the presentation
of our results, we report the probabilities of the correct option emerging as
the outcome under those various decision rules for just a few examples
involving electorates of different sizes (11, 31, 51 and 71) and a few selected
probabilities of each voter choosing correct and incorrect outcomes.
[Table 2 about here]
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Table 2:  Probability that the "correct" option (option 1) is the unique
winner
Scenario 1:   
k = 2
p1 = 0.51
p2 = 0.49
Scenario 2:   
k = 3
p1 = 0.6
p2 = 0.3
p3 = 0.1
Scenario 3:   
k = 3
p1 = 0.51
p2 = 0.25
p3 = 0.24
Scenario 4:
k=3
p1 = 0.40
p2 = 0.30
p3 = 0.30
Scenario 5:   
k=3
p1 = 0.34
p2 = 0.33
p1 = 0.33
Scenario 6:
k=3
p1 = 0.335
p2 = 0.3325
p3 = 0.3325
plurality    
n=11
n=31
n=51
n=71
0.527
0.545
0.557
0.567
0.821
0.957
0.988
0.996
0.699
0.915
0.972
0.991
0.419
0.581
0.666
0.726
0.268
0.322
0.338
0.344
0.256
0.302
0.311
0.313
pairwise
Condorcet   
n=11
n=31
n=51
n=71
0.527
0.545
0.557
0.567
0.877
0.973
0.993
0.998
0.805
0.959
0.991
0.998
0.514
0.652
0.740
0.802
0.327
0.339
0.348
0.356
0.312
0.313
0.315
0.317
Borda    
n=11
n=31
n=51
n=71
0.527
0.545
0.557
0.567
0.864
0.976
0.995
0.999
0.805
0.967
0.994
0.505
0.666
0.760
0.823
0.316
0.344
0.360
0.371
0.301
0.318
0.326
0.330
Hare
n=11
n=31
n=51
n=71
0.527
0.545
0.557
0.567
0.875
0.973
0.993
0.998
0.801
0.955
0.989
0.527
0.655
0.760
0.352
0.365
0.369
0.382
0.338
0.341
0.338
Coombs   
n=11
n=31
n=51
n=71
0.527
0.545
0.557
0.567
0.877
0.973
0.993
0.816
0.962
0.991
0.998
0.539
0.675
0.755
0.354
0.368
0.372
0.385
0.338
0.342
0.339
0.346
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Definitions48:
Plurality rule:  "Choose the candidate who is ranked first by the largest
number of voters."
Condorcet pairwise criterion:  "Choose the candidate [if unique] who defeats [or
at least ties with] all others in pairwise elections using majority rule."
Borda count:  "Give each of the m candidates a score of 1 to k based on the
candidate's ranking in a voter's preference ordering; that is, the candidate
ranked first receives m points, the second one k-l, .., the lowest-ranked
candidate one point.  The candidate [if unique] with the highest number of
points is declared the winner."
Hare system:  "Each voter indicates the candidate he ranks highest of the k
candidates.  Remove from the list of candidates the one [or in case of ties,
ones] ranked highest by the fewest voters.  Repeat the procedure for the
remaining k-1 candidates.  Continue until only [at most] one candidate
remains.  Declare this candidate [if any] the winner."
Coombs system:  "Each voter indicates the candidate he ranks lowest of the k
candidates.  Remove from the list of candidates the one [or in case of ties,
ones] ranked lowest by the most voters.  Repeat the procedure for the
remaining k-1 candidates.  Continue until only [at most] one candidate
remains.  Declare this candidate [if any] the winner."
                                                
48All definitions are from Mueller 1989, pp. 112-3.
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Before proceeding to any more detailed commentary on Table 2, one
important thing to say about all the calculations within it is this.  The
probabilities reported in the cells of that table represent the probability with
which the correct outcome will be uniquely chosen by each decision rule.
Decision rules can fail to do so in either of two ways.  One is by choosing the
wrong outcome.  Another is by choosing no outcome, or anyway none
uniquely.  Sometimes, for example, there simply is no Condorcet winner;
where there is not, we count that as a failure.  And sometimes decision rules
produce no unique winner; we count indecisiveness, in cases of "ties," as a
failure as well.  The probability statistics in Table 2 thus reflect decisiveness as
well as correctness per se.49
As we have said, all these decision rules are extensionally equivalent to
one another in two-option case.  That is shown in Table 2, Scenario 1.  That
scenario represents the "standard" Condorcet jury theorem finding, in its
classical k=2 form.  And it serves as a benchmark against which the epistemic
performance of other decision rules in k>2 cases can be compared.
Where the probability of each voter choosing the correct option
remains at 0.51, but the number of options increases from k=2 to k=3, the
probability of the correct outcome being chosen is greatly increased over that
of the correct outcome being chosen in the two-option case.  We have noted
that already in connection with plurality voting, in our discussion of Table 1.
What we see from Table 2, when comparing Scenarios 1 and 3, is that that is
true (indeed, even more true) of all of the other standard social decision rules
as well.
                                                
49 Casual inspection of sample calculations may seem to suggest that that might be why the
Borda rule overtakes the Condorcet pairwise rule, where n is large.  It is clearly the
reason why the Hare and Coombs rules seem to become "less reliable" for n=51 than for
n=31.  Those rules can be indecisive  (i.e., result in ties ) in the k=3 case only when n is a
multiple of 2 or 3; and that affects the case of n=51 uniquely among the values of n for
which Table 2 calculates these probabilities.
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Where the probability of each voter choosing the correction option
drops to just over 1/k, and the probabilities of choosing each of the wrong
ones to just under that, all of these decision rules will obviously require large
electorates (larger than the computing power avaiable to us allows us to
analyze) in order to achieve any very high degree of epistemic strength.  That
is seen clearly from Scenarios 5 and especially 6 in Table 2.  But what is clear
from the computations we have been able to perform is that the epistemic
strength of each of the decision rules increases with the size of the
electorate.50  If Young's result (based though it is on rather different
assumptions) can be applied, then there is every reason to believe that
Condorcet or Borda rules, anyway, will if anything exceed the high epistemic
strength found in Table 1 for the plurality rule.
There are many odd and interesting small differences among decision
rules revealed in Table 2.  Some of them might be quirks or artefacts of our
particular methodology for calcualting the probabilities.51  Others might
reflect deeper facts about the decision rules in question.
The principal things we want to point out about Table 2, however, are
not the differences but rather the broad similarities among all these decision
rules.  Particularly where the size of the electorate is at all large (51 or over,
say), each of these decision rules is pretty nearly as good a truth-tracker as
any other.  Even in the worst case, in Scenario 6, the epistemic strength of the
worst decision rule (plurality) is only a few percentage points worse than the
best (Hare or Coombs), in electorates of 51 or more.
That is the first "big" conclusion we would draw from Table 2.  Any of
these standard decision rules is pretty much as good as any other, on
epistemic grounds.  We are at liberty to choose among them, according to
                                                
50 The exception in Table 2 is with the Hare and Coombs rules, in Scenario 6.  The
explanation for that exception is provided in the preceding footnote.
51 Such as the apparent "reversal" with Hare and Coombs rules, discussed in the preceding
note.
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their varying proceduralist merits, pretty much without fear of any epistemic
consequences.
The second "big" conclusion we would draw from Table 2 is this.  All of
these standard decision rules have great epistemic merits, at least whenever
the electorate is reasonably large.  These merits are greatest where the
probability of each voter choosing the correct outcome is substantially larger
than 1/k (Scenarios 2 and 3).  But these merits are still great, at least where the
electorate is at all large (over 51, say), even where the probability of each
voter choosing the correct outcome is much nearer the probabilities of each
voter choosing incorrect ones (Scenario 4).  It is only where the probability of
each voter choosing correctly is just barely over 1/k, and of choosing each
incorrect option is just under that, that very large electorates will be required
to yield really reliable results (Scenarios 5 and 6).  But even there, with a
realistically large electorate (the size of a city, say), epistemic strength will
grow high.  And all of that seems broadly speaking true of all the standard
decision rules ordinarily canvassed.
IV.  Conclusions
Social choice theorists and electoral reformers squabble endlessly over what
is the "best" democratic decision rule from a procedural point of view.  Here
we have shown that we can afford to be relatively relaxed about that choice
from an epistemic point of view.  Some social decision rules (Coombs and
Hare) seem to be marginally better truth-trackers than others.  But when the
electorate is even remotely large, all of the standardly-discussed decision
rules (including even the plurality rule) are almost equally good truth-trackers.
There is little to choose among them, on epistemic grounds.
30
Furthermore, all of them are good truth-trackers — insofar, of course,
as there are any "truths" for politics to track at all.52  Just how good they all
are depends on the size of the electorate and the reliability of electors.  But
even in the worst-case scenarios, it takes only city-sized electorates to allow
us to be highly confident that the epistemically correct outcome emerges
under any of the standard democratic decision rules (just so long as we can be
minimally confident in the reliability of individual voters).  In short,
democracy in any of its standard forms is potentially a good truth-tracker:  it
can always hope to claim that epistemic merit, whatever other procedural
merits any particular version of it might also manifest.
Thus, we have not so much settled these standing controversies in
democratic theory as circumvented them.53  Proceduralists of the social-
choice sort who are enamored of the axiomatic merits of the Condorcet
pairwise rule, for example, may feel free to recommend that rule on
democratic-proceduralist grounds, without fear of any great epistemic costs.
Old-fashioned democratic proceduralists who are anxious that people be
governed by rules that they can understand, and who are thus attracted to
the plurality rule by reasons of its sheer simplicity and minimal informational
requirements, may feel almost equally free to recommend that rule without
any great epistemic costs.  Democracy has potentially great epistemic merits,
in any of its many forms.
                                                
52
 Cf. Black 1958, p. 163; Miller 1992, p. 56.
53
 Assuming, of course, our results stand up to further, more detailed scrutiny of the sort we indicated
above is needed (at footnotes 36-7).  Specifically, strategic manipulation might be much more of a
risk in many-option cases, and different decision rules might be differentially vulnerable to it.
Further investigation of those issues is clearly required.   Pending those further investigations,
however, these represent our present, tentative conclusions.
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Appendix 1:  A Simple k-option Condorcet Jury Model
Suppose that there are n voters/jurors, that there are k options, x1, x2, ...,  xk
(where k>1), and that each voter/juror has independent probabilities p1, p2, ...,
pk of voting for x1, x2, ...,  xk as his/her first choice, respectively (where å ipi =
1).
Let X1, X2, ..., Xk be the random variables whose values are the numbers of
first-choice votes (out of a total of n votes) cast for x1, x2, ...,  xk, respectively.
The joint distribution of X1, X2, ..., Xk is a multinomial distribution with the
following probability function:
          n!
P(X1=n1, X2=n2, ..., Xk=nk) = ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾  p1n1 p2n2 ... pknk .
 n1! n2! ... nk!
For each i, the mean of Xi is m i  = npi, the variance of Xi is s i2 = npi(1-pi), and,
for each i and j (i„ j), the covariance of Xi and Xj is s ij2 = -npipj.
Proposition 1. For each i, the probability that xi will win under plurality
voting is
              n!
P(for all j „ i, Xi > Xj) = å n1, n2, ..., nk : å jnj=n & for all j „ i, ni>nj ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾  p1
n1 p2n2 ... pknk.
          n1! n2! ... nk!
In particular, note that since the joint distribution of X1, X2, ..., Xk is
multinomial, if pi is greatest among p1, p2, ...,  pk, then so is P(for all j„ i, Xi > Xj)
(i.e. the probability that xi will win under plurality voting) among the
probabilities corresponding to x1, x2, ...,  xk.
Proposition 2. Suppose, for a fixed i, we have, for all j„ i, pi > pj. Then the
probability that xi will win under plurality voting tends to 1 as n tends to
infinity, i.e. P(for all j„ i, Xi > Xj) fi  1 as n fi  ¥ .
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Sketch proof. Consider the vector of random variables X* = <X*1, X*2, ...,
X*k>, where, for each i, X*i:= Xi/n. The joint distribution of the X*i is a
multinomial distribution with mean vector p = <p1, p2, ...,  pk> and with
variance-covariance matrix S  = (sij), where, for each i and each j, sij = pi(1-pi) if
i=j and sij = -pipj if i„ j. By the central limit theorem, for large n, Ö (n)(X*-p) has
an approximate multivariate normal distribution N(0, S ). This implies that, for
large n, X*-p has an approximate multivariate normal distribution N(0, 1/n S ).
Let fn : Rk fi  R be the corresponding density function for X*-p. Using this
density function, the probability that option xi will win under plurality voting
is given by P(for all j„ i, X*i > X*j) »  ò   t˛ Wi fn(t)dt, where Wi := {t = <t1, t2, ...,  tk> ˛
Rk : for all j„ i, pi+ti > pj+tj}. Since, by assumption, for all j„ i, pi > pj, there exists
an e >0 such that S   0,e ˝ Wi, where S   0,e   is a sphere around 0 with radius e . Then,
since fn is nonnegative, ò   t˛ Wi fn(t)dt ‡ ò   t˛ S   0,e fn(t)dt. But, as fn is the density function
corresponding to N(0, 1/n S ), ò   t˛ S   0,e fn(t)dt fi  1 as n fi  ¥ , and the desired result
follows. Q.E.D.
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Appendix 2:  A Simple Heuristic for Deriving Probabilities over Preference
Orderings from Probabilities over Single Votes
The model introduced in appendix 1 is suitable for assessing the epistemic
qualities of plurality voting and, more generally, of voting procedures whose
input is a single vote, or most preferred option, for each voter/juror. To
assess the epistemic qualities of voting procedures whose input is a complete
preference ordering (rather than just a single vote or most preferred option)
for each voter/juror, more information is required. We will extend our
model as follows. Given the k! logically possible strict preference orderings,
P1, P2, ...,  Pk!, over the k options, x1, x2, ...,  xk, we will assume that each
voter/juror has independent probabilities p*1, p*2, ...,  p*k! of submitting P1, P2,
...,  Pk! as his/her preference ordering, respectively (where å ipi = 1).
Now let X*1, X*2, ..., X*k! be the random variables whose values are the
numbers of voters/jurors submitting the orderings P1, P2, ...,  Pk!, respectively.
Again, the joint distribution of X*1, X*2, ..., X*k! is a multinomial distribution
with the following probability function:
                 n!
P(X*1=n1, X*2=n2, ..., X*k!=nk!) = ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾  p*1n1 p*2n2 ... p*k!nk! .
       n1! n2! ... nk!!
Given any criterion for determining a winning option (such as the pairwise
Condorcet, Borda, Hare, Coombs and of course plurality criteria), we can
then use this probability function to compute, for each  i, the probability that
option xi will win under the given criterion.
To compare the epistemic qualities of plurality voting with those of voting
procedures whose input is a complete preference ordering for each
voter/juror, we use a simple heuristic for deriving the probabilities p*1, p*2, ...,
p*k! associated with the preference orderings P1, P2, ...,  Pk! from the given
probabilities p1, p2, ...,  pk associated with the options x1, x2, ...,  xk.
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In the original k-option jury model, an individual voter/juror's vote is
effectively modeled as a single draw from an urn with a proportion of p1, p2,
...,  pk balls of types x1, x2, ...,  xk, respectively. Similarly, in the new model, an
individual voter/juror's strict preference ordering over k options will be
modeled as a sequence of k draws (corresponding to the k ranks in the
preference ordering) from an urn with an initial proportion of p1, p2, ...,  pk
balls of types x1, x2, ...,  xk, respectively, and where after each draw all balls of
the type drawn are removed, so that eventually, in the k-th (and last) draw
only one type of balls is left in the urn. Now the probability associated with
an ordering Pi is simply the probability that, in this urn model, the options are
drawn in precisely the order in which they are ranked by the ordering Pi.
Formally, if Pi is the ordering xi1 > xi2 > ... >  xik, the probability associated with
Pi is simply
pi1        pi2 pi3                pik-1   
¾  * ¾ ¾  * ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾  * ... * ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾  * 1.
1     1-pi1      1-(pi1+pi2)    1-(pi1+pi2+...+ pik-2)
To illustrate, table 3 lists the probabilities associated with all logically possible
orderings derived from the probabilities associated with single votes in the
three-option scenarios of table 2.
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Table 3: Probabilities over preference orderings derived from probabilities
over single votes
p option x1
(correct)
p option x2
p option x3
Scenario 2:   
k = 3
0.6
0.3
0.1
Scenario 3:   
k = 3
0.51
0.25
0.24
Scenario 4:
k=3
0.40
0.30
0.30
Scenario 5:   
k=3
0.34
0.33
0.33
Scenario 6:
k=3
0.335
0.3325
0.3325
p x1>x2>x3   
p x1>x3>x2
p x2>x1>x3
p x2>x3>x1
p x3>x1>x2
p x3>x2>x1
0.450
0.150
0.257
0.043
0.067
0.033
0.260
0.250
0.170
0.080
0.161
0.079
0.200
0.200
0.171
0.129
0.171
0.129
0.170
0.170
0.168
0.162
0.168
0.162
0.1675
0.1675
0.1669
0.1656
0.1669
0.1656
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